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DEFENSE CONTRACT FINANCING UNDER THE
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS ACT
CYRUS E. PHILLIPS, IV*t
INTRODUCTION
In the current spate of articles, seminars, and general concern among
members of the bar over all aspects of public contracting, an area of
discussion that seems to have been overlooked is the manner by which
public contracts, and more particularly, Government defense contracts
may be financed.
Although today there does not seem to be the impetus toward exten-
sive utilization of the Guaranteed Loan ("V-Loan")1 or Advance Pay-
ments2 financing procedures that characterized Government defense
contracting during the Second World War and the Korean Conflict, the
trend today, especially in view of the tight situation in the current money
market, is to make increasing use of the less complex methods of financ-
ing production, particularly through the medium of progress payments'
or accounts receivable financing under the Assignment of Claims Act
of 1940.'
The purpose of this paper will be to discuss the many facets of ac-
counts receivable financing under the Act, setting forth some of the
advantages (and pitfalls) to be gained thereby.
BACKGROUND-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Assignment of claims against the United States was at first strictly
regulated, there being statutory provision to the effect that no claim
*A.B., 1966, University of Illinois; J.D., 1968, Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
College of William and Mary; Member, Virginia Bar; Attorney, Defense Supply
Agency, Defense Construction Supply Center.
tThe views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not imply
the endorsement of the Department of Defense or any agencies thereof.
1. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. ApP. 5 2091 (1964); Exec. Order No.
10,480, 3 C.F.R., 1949-1953 Comp.; DOD Directive No. 5100.34.
2. 10 U.S.C. § 2307 (1964). Advance payments are also authorized pursuant to
50 U.S.C.A. § 1431 et. seq.; Exec. Order No. 10,789, 3 C.F.R., 1954-1958 Comp.; DOD
Directive No. 7830.1.
3. 10 U.S.C. § 2307 (1964). The details of obtaining progress payments are set forth
in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, Appendix E-500, 32 C.F.R. § 163.69
[hereinafter cited as ASPRI.
4. 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1964); 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
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against the United States could be assigned except after the issuance
of a warrant for payment and proper attestation and acknowledgment
of the instrument by which the assignment was to be accomplished. 5
It was said that the purpose of the anti-assignment statute was to prevent
persons of influence from buying up claims against the United States
which might be improperly urged upon the accounting officers of the
Government, to prevent the possible multiple payment of claims, to
make unnecessary the investigation of the validity of alleged assign-
ments, and to enable the Government to deal only with the original
claimant.6
However, the courts were quick to realize that the rigors of the
anti-assignment statutes were not applicable to situations wherein the
interest of the United States was not at stake, thus holding that an
assignment of a claim not in strict accordance with the statutes might
nonetheless be valid as between the assignor and assignee although void
insofar as the United States was concerned.7 Since the anti-assignment
statutes had been enacted for the benefit of the Government,, it might
waive that protection and give recognition to such assignments as be-
tween the parties.
As the impact of Government and public contracting increased dur-
ing the Depression, it was recognized that some form of simple financing
should be made available to Government contractors; and temporary
legislation was enacted which provided for assignment to any national or
state bank of claims due or to become due under a Government con-
tract." Recognizing the immediate need for financing the massive de-
fense production effort that would be necessary to successfully resolve
the impending conflict, Congress took action in the latter part of 1940
to effect a permanent amendment of the anti-assignment statutes so that
private financing would be readily available to those contractors en-
5. REv. STAT. §§ 3477, 3737. For an excellent discussion of the history of the Act,
see Nichols, Assignme-nt of Claims Act of 1940-A Decade Later, 12 U. PiTr. L. REv.
538 (1950).
6. See, e.g., Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U.S. 484, 498 (1878); Goodman v. Niblack, 102
U.S. 556, 560 (1880).
7. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1945); Martin v. National Sur. Co.,
300 U.S. 588 (1937).
8. Cf. National Industrial Recovery Act, June 16, 1933, ch. 90, Art. II, §§ 201,
206(a), 48 Stat. 200; Work Relief and Public Works Appropriation Act of 1938,
June 21, 1938, ch. 554, §§ 201-5, 52 Stat. 816; Independent Office's Appropriation Act
of 1943, June 27, 1942, ch. 450, 56 Stat. 410 (extending time for execution under
preceding Acts).
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gaged in performance under Government contracts.9 The end result
of such concern was the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940.10
The only major revision of the Act was made in 1951, when Con-
gress, dissatisfied with decisions of the Comptroller General of the
United States holding that the United States could assert claims against
an assignor directly against the assignee by way of set-off, restitution,
or repayment for claims arising under the contract or independently of
the contract for unpaid withholding and social security taxes on wages
earned under the contract,"- amended the Act to limit the assignee's
9. H. R. REP. No. 2925, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); S. REP. No. 2136, 76th Gong,
3d Sess. (1940).
10. Act of Oct. 9, 1940, ch. 779, § 1, 54 Stat. 1029. As amended [Act of May 15,
1951, ch. 75, 65 Star. 41] the Act provides substantially as follows:
(1) that the prohibition against assignment of claims against the United
States does not apply in any case in which [T]he moneys due or to be-
come due from the United States . . . under a contract providing for
payments aggregating $1,000 or more, are assigned to a bank, trust
company, or other financial institution. . . .; (2) [that] . . . any such
assignment shall cover all payments due or to become due under
such contract and not already paid, shall not be made to more than one
party, and shall not be subject to further assignment, except that any
such assignment may be made to one party as agent or trustee for two
or more parties participating in such financing. . . .; (3) [that the
assignee] . . . shall file written notice of the assignment together with
a true copy of the instrument of assignment with (a) the contracting
officer or the head of his department or agency, (b) the surety ... ,
and (c) the disbursing officer. . . .; (4) [that] . . . no liability of any
nature of the assignor to the United States . . ., whether arising from or
independently of such contract, shall create or impose any liability on
the part of the assignee to make restitution, refund, or repayment to the
United States of any amount . . . received under such contract . . .;
(5) [and that] . . . [Amny contract of the Department of Defense, the
General Services Administration, . . . or any department or agency
of the United States designated by the President . . . in time of war or
national emergency . . . [may] provide that payments to be made to the
assignee . . . shall not be subject to reduction or set-off . . . for any
liability of any nature of the assignor to the United States . . . which
arises independently of such contract, or . . . for any liability of the
assignor on account of (1) renegotiation under any renegotiation stat-
ute . . ., (2) fines, (3) penalties (which term does not include amounts
which may be collected or withheld from the assignor for failure to
comply with the terms of the contract), or (4) taxes, social security con-
tributions, or the withholding or nonwithholding of social security
contributions, whether arising from or independently of such contract.
11. See, Ms. Comp. GEN. B-93528 (Dec. 29, 1950); Ms. Comvp. GEN. B-72929 (May 18,
1950). A good discussion of the background of the 1951 amendment may be found
in Note, Financing by Assignment of Government Contracts: Expanding the Assignee's
Risk, 60 YALE L.J. 548 (1951).
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derivative liability for restitution and enacted the so-called "no set-off"
clause. This clause, when included in a contract, diminishes the Govern-
ment's common-law right of set-off.'2
NATURE OF THE AssiGNzFrNT
An assignment under the Act comes into effect only upon an under-
lying contractual obligation;' however, an assignment may come into
existence at any time thereafter, and has in fact been recognized as valid
even after the vouchers for payment have been prepared.14 The only
requirement for the validity of an assignment executed during the per-
formance of a contract is that some right or obligation under the con-
tract remain unsettled. 15 The assignment will not be considered to be
binding upon the Government until the contracting officer has received
notice of the assignment, 6 but it is not necessary that such notice
strictly comply with all the requirements of the Act to be considered
binding upon the Government, the Comptroller General having indi-
cated that substantial compliance with the notice and filing require-
ments is sufficient to render the instrument binding.' 7
Upon an otherwise valid assignment, the assignee succeeds only to
whatever rights its assignor had to the contract proceeds; for example,
any amounts due the Government under the Price Redetermination 8
and Default' 9 clauses may be withheld from payment to the assignee. 0
But in such a case the Government would be precluded from recovering
12. The "no set-off" clause is contained in General Provision 8(a) of GSA Standard
Form 32, June 1964 edition) ASPR App. F-100.32) and is authorized by ASPR 7-103.8
for inclusion in all Department of Defense contracts. The cited ASPR implementation
also sets forth additional notice and filing requirements. By Exec. Order No. 10,840,
3 C.F.R., 1959-1963 Comp., and Exec. Order No. 10,824, 3 C.F.R., 1959-1963 Comp., the
President has designated the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration as additional agencies to which the "no set-off"
provisions apply. The state of national emergency contained in Presidential Proclama-
tion No. 2,914, 3 C.F.R., 1949-1953 Comp., is still in effect.
13. Ms. CoArp. GEN. B-153171 (Oct. 8, 1964).
14. Central Nat. Bank v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 738 (Ct. Cl. 1950); Ms. CoMe
GENi. B-122071 (Dec. 1, 1954).
15. Ms. Comp. GEN. B-125205 (Nov. 14, 1955); cf. 31 Comp. GEN. 685 (1952).
16. Ms. Coue. GEN. B-158451 (March 3, 1966).
17. 20 Comp. GEN. 424 (1941).
18. ASPR 7-109.2, 7-109.4.
19. ASPR 7-103.11.
20. Ms. CoAr. GEN. B-119142 (Oct. 1, 1954); Ms. Com. GEN. B-110730 (Sept. 18,
1952); Ms. Cowe. GEN. B-84138 (May 17, 1949).
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any sums directly paid to the assignee by way of restitution or repay-
ment under the 1951 amendment to the Act.
Conversely, where an assignment has been properly effected, the
assignee is entitled to all additional proceeds that come due under the
terms of the contract, as under the Changes clause,21 without the neces-
sity of a separate assignment.22 The rationale for such a result seems to
be that the rights and obligations of the parties were fixed by the in-
clusion of the clauses in the terms of the original contract, so that the
various equitable adjustments accomplished pursuant to such clauses can
be construed merely to render more definite the extent of the parties'
liabilities.
It should also be noted that the assignee's right to the contract pro-
ceeds is in the nature of a legal, rather than an equitable right,a so that
once an assignment has been properly effected it cannot be revoked by
the assignor.24 Similarly, the assignee's legal right to the proceeds ceases
sua sponte when the loan secured by the assignment has been dis-
charged.2
Although the general rule is that the assignee has but a legal right of
subrogation to the claim of its assignor against the Government, the
Court of Claims has found that in certain situations where the application
of the fraud and false claim statutes26 would lead to the forfeiture of a
claim on the part of an innocent assignee, that the assignee attains the
same status as that of the holder of a negotiable note insofar as those
statutes are concerned, so that the assignee's claim is not forfeited by
fraud on the part of the assignor.27
Since the assignee's rights against the Government arise only by way
of subrogation, it is clear that there is no privity of contract between the
Government and the assignee;28 consequently, the Government cannot
21. ASPR 7-103.2.
22. 23 CoMvP. GEN. 943 (1944).
23. Cf. Ms. COMP. GEN. B-149657 (Feb. 9, 1965).
24. 35 Comvp. GEN. 104, 106 (1955).
25. Beaconwear Clothing Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl. 1966). Although
the Act specifically prohibits the further assignment of a claim to the contract pro-
ceeds, the Comptroller General has not construed the Act as prohibiting, upon the
release of the original assignment, the reassignment of any remaining amounts payable
under the contract. Ms. CoMp. GEN. B-155400 (Dec. 3, 1964); 39 Comp. GEN. 533
(1960); Ms. COMP. GEN. B-33501 (April 1, 1943). Contra, Durant Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 168 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Okla. 1958).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2514 (1964); 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1964).
27. Arlington Trust Co. v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 817 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
28. Ms. COMP. GEN. B-69120 (Dec. 18, 1947).
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be charged with the duty of notifying the assignee as to the status of
the contract or the existence of any outstanding claims against the con-
tractor arising independently of the contract.29 The test as to the degree
of duty owed by the Government to the assignee is one of good-faith
dealings, however, so that if the Government knows or has the means of
knowing that the contract assigned is worthless, and if the Government
is ignorant of that fact only because of its own carelessness in overpay-
ing the assignor, it may not take advantage of such carelessness and negli-
gence in an attempt to recoup indirectly such negligent overpayments
from the assignee.-0
The assignee's claim under an otherwise valid assignment is limited by
the amount of the assignor's indebtedness to the assignee,"- although
it is not necessary for the assignee to prove that advances made by it
under the assignment were used for the performance of Government
contracts.32
CONTRACTS PROVIDING FOR PAYMENTS
AGGREGATING ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS OR MoRE
Since the Act makes specific provision for assignments under "cn-
tracts providing for payments aggregating $1,000 or more," a question
arises as to what constitutes a "contract" for the purposes of the Act.
In the case of the usual fixed-price solicitation utilizing GSA Standard
Forms 33 and 33A,33 Instruction 10(d) of GSA Standard Form 33A
provides in pertinent part that written awards will be mailed to the
successful offeror within the time specified for acceptance, so that a
binding bilateral contract will result on deposit of the award notice in
29. South Side Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1955);
Ms. Co~M. GEN. B-45291 (Nov. 21, 1944).
30. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. United States, 280 F.2d 832 (Ct. Cl. 1960). A case in
the same vein is Central Nat'l Bank v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 738 (Ct. Cl. 1950),
holding that where the assignee gives timely notice of the assignment, but due to
inadvertence on the part of the Government payments are made directly to the
assignor rather than the assignee, the Government will be treated as an ordinary
debtor so that the assignee may recover from the Government sums erroneously paid
to the assignor.
31. Coleman v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 490 (1962); Ms. ComP. GEN. B-156871
(Aug. 4, 1965); 37 Come. GEN. 9 (1957); 36 CoM. GEN. 19 (1956); 35 CoM. GuN. 104
(1955).
32. 36 Com. GEN. 19, 21 (1956); cf. Peterman Lumber Co. v. Adams, 128 F. Supp. 6
(W.D. Ark. 1955).
33. GSA Standard Form 33, July 1966 (ASPR App. F-100.33), and GSA Standard
Form 33A, July 1966 (ASPR App. F-100.33A)
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the mail by the Government. 4 In such a case, an assignment executed
after the specified date but prior to receipt of the formal contract by the
offeror will be deemed to have been made under a "contract" as de-
fined by the Act 35
Insofar as other types of Government contracts are concerned, since
the Armed Services Procurement Regulation specifically provides that
Basic Agreements 6 and Basic Ordering Agreements37 are not to be
treated as contracts but rather as advance understandings as to the terms
and conditions of any contract executed thereunder, it is clear that an
assignment under such an agreement would not be effective until a
binding bilateral contract had been effected. The same result would not
be reached under Indefinite Delivery Type Contracts,38 since in such
instruments there is an underlying right or obligation upon which the
concept of a "contract" may exist.
In short, the test of a "contract" seems to be whether or not there is
a binding bilateral agreement between the assignor and the Govern-
ment, so that, for example, under a unilateral Purchase Order 9 an
assignment would not be effective until the order had been accepted in
writing or the assignor had performed the exact act requested by the
order."
Concerning the requirement of "payments aggregating $1,000 or
more," the Comptroller General will recognize instruments obligating
funds less than $1,000 issued under a master agreement such as those
of the Indefinite Delivery Type previously discussed, so long as it can
be determined that the entire amount due under the master contract will
aggregate $1,000 or more.4' In such event, it would also seem per-
missibile to execute one instrument of assignment covering each order
subsequendy issued against the master agreement.42
34. 45 COMP. GEN. 701 (1966).
35. Ms. Comp. GEN. B-153171 (Oct. 8, 1964); Ms. ComP. GEN. B-29624 (Oct. 29,
1942). Where award is consummated by use of GSA Standard Form 26, July, 1966
(ASPR App. F-100.26), ASPR 16-102.2(h) provides in pertinent part that although
the award may specify an effective date, that a mutually binding agreement may be
found to be in existence prior thereto, so that the question of whether there is a
"contract" within the meaning of the Act prior to the effective date of the formal
award would depend on the particular circumstances in each case.
36. ASPR 3-410.1.
37. Id. 3-410.2.
38. Id. 3-409.
39. Id. 3-608.
40. Ordnance Parts Company, ASBCA No. 12820, 68-1 BCA f 6870 (1968).
41. 23 COMP. GEN. 989 (1944).
42. Cf. Ms. CoMp. GEN. B-24402 (Sept. 21, 1942).
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QUALITIES OF A PROPER ASSIGNEE
The Act provides that assignments shall be executed in favor of a
"bank, trust company, or other financial institution." Although the
Act makes perfectly clear what is a "bank" or "trust company," the
determination of what constitutes a "financial'institution" has been
another important problem facing those agencies charged with imple-
menting the Act.
A determination of whether a particular entity meets the definition
of a "financial institution" must be left to the particular facts and circum-
stances surrounding each case, since the tendency has been to construe
the term in a broad sense. Generally however, any business concern
that regularly engages in credit extension and receivables financing,
as opposed to one that does so on a basis incidental to its primary opera-
tions, may be considered to meet the definition of a "financial institu-
tion." 4 3 Pension trusts,44 small business investment companies organized
under the Small Business Act,' and partnerships 0 have been held to be
proper assignees under the Act; the only requirement in each case is
that financing operations must be the assignee's principal business.
The Act also provides that an "assignment may be made to one party
as agent or trustee for two or more parties participating in such finan-
cing"; thus, it has been held that an assignment to a bank from a whole-
sale merchant under a Government contract, such assignment providing
that all sums collected thereunder are to be turned over to the wholesale
merchant's factor who borrowed money from the bank to finance the
wholesaler's performance, is a proper assignment under the Act.47 The
only requirement in this type of third party financing is that the legal
right to collect the proceeds must vest in a single financial institution.
ASSIGNEaE'S DERIVATIVE LABILITY FOR RESTiTUTION OR REPAYMENT
As previously mentioned, certain decisions of the Comptroller Gen-
eral prompted the Congress in 1951 to amend the Act to provide that
no liability of the assignor to the United States would impose any
liability on the assignee to make restitution or repayment. The effect of
this amendment was to preclude the Government from recovering from
43. 22 Comp. GEN. 44, 46 (1942); 21 CoMp. GEN. 120 (1941); 20 Comp. GEN. 415
(1941); Ms. Coxo. GEN. B-14682 (Feb. 5, 1941).
44. 40 CoAM. GEN. 174 (1960).
45. 43 Comp. GEN. 138 (1963).
46. 31 Comp. GEN. 90 (1951).
47. Chelsea Factors, Inc. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 685 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
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an assignee erroneous payments made under an assignment, except in
the case of fraud on the part of the assignee.48
But it should be noted that the effect of the 1951 amendment is to
preclude recovery by restitution or repayment in those cases where
the assignee's liability is derivative only, so that the remedy is available
to the Government in those cases where the assignee has directly en-
gaged in fraudulent conduct. Fraud on the part of the assignor or its
agents is not sufficient, however, to permit recovery as against the
assignee.49
SET-OFF AGAINST THE ASSIGNEE
In the absence of a "no set-off" clause as provided for in the 1951
amendment of the Act, the rights of the assignee are governed by the
common law, so that the assignee has no greater right against the ob-
ligor, the Government in this instance, than his assignor50 Thus the
fact that the assignee is not on notice of a debt arising under the con-
tract when it accepts the assignment does not defeat the Government's
right of set-off.51
Although the Comptroller General had previously acquiesced in the
position that under the common law of assignments, debts of the assignor
which matured after an assignment was effected might not be set-off
against payments otherwise due an assignee, 2 his recent decisions indi-
cate that the former view will not be followed; hence, debts owed to the
United States by the assignor which existed before the effective date of
the assignment may, at the time they mature, be set-off against mature
obligations owed by the Government to the assigneeP
In those contracts containing the "no set-off" clause authorized under
the Act, the Government's common law right of set-off is nullified in-
sofar as claims arising independently of the contract are concerned and
is limited to those claims under the contract which are not specifically
exempted by the "no set-off" provisions. Thus it has been held that the
48. Compare United States v. Hadden, 192 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1951), ,with Mercantile
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 280 F.2d 832 (Ct. Cl. 1960), and American Fidelity Co.
v. National City Bank, 266 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
49. Daval Handbags, Inc., ASBCA No. 3899, 59-2 BCA 2387 (1959).
50. 37 CoMP. GEN. 318 (1957).
51. South Side Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1955); Ms.
CoMP. GEN. B-157886 (Nov. 12, 1965).
52. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Ala. 1953); 37 CoMp.
Gen. 318 (1957); 20 COMP. GEN. 458 (1941).
53. 37 COMP. GEN. 808 (1958).
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"no set-off" clause prohibits the United States from collecting, by way
of set-off against the assignee, a tax claim against the assignor which
had matured prior to notice of assignment.5
The inclusion of a "no set-off" clause in a contract does not preclude
the Government from withholding payments during performance of
the contract to accomplish set-off for claims arising under the contract
and not specifically exempted by the Act,-5 such as claims for excess
costs under the Default clause,"6 or for penalties or withholdings assessed
under the terms of the Davis-Bacon, 7 Walsh-Healey s5 or Contract
Work Hours Standards Acts, 9 the provisions of which are incorporated
in certain contracts by reference.60
Where a "no set-off" clause is included in a contract, it should be
emphasized that the clause will only operate to immunize those pro-
ceeds from set-off that are attributable to the assignor's indebtedness to
the assignee, so that any amounts in excess of this sum remaining in the
hands of the Government may be applied to debts of the assignor arising
independently of the contract.61
CONFLICTS BETWEEN ASSIGNEE AND SURETY
An uncertain point under the Act has been the conflicting interpreta-
tion of the right of a surety under Miller Act 2 performance and
payment bonds versus the right of an assignee to the retained percentages
withheld by the Government to assure performance under defaulted
construction contracts.63 Generally, the Miller Act requires that con-
struction contractors furnish a performance bond to secure complete
54. Rose v. United States, 373 F.2d 963 (Ct. CI. 1967); 37 Compy. GEN. 318 (1957).
55. 45 Cor. GEN. 484 (1966) (liquidated damages).
56. 35 Comp. GEN. 149 (1955). The default clause may be found in ASPR App.
F-100.32, General Provision 11.
57. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276(a)-(a) (7) (1964).
58. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1964).
59. 40 U.S.C. §§ 327-30 (1964).
60. Ms. Comp. GEN. B-150528 (Feb. 1, 1950).
61. 37 CoMP. GEN. 9 (1957); 36 Com-P. GEN. 19, 21 (1956); 35 Compu'. GEN. 104, 108
(1955).
62. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270(a)-(e).
63. Under the payments clause of GSA Standard Form 23-A, (ASPR App.
F-100.23-A.) the Government agrees to make monthly progress payments as the work
progresses, withholding ten percent of the amount of each payment until final com-
pletion and acceptance. A detailed discussion of the entire topic of conflicting claims
to the retained percentages may be found in Speidel, "Stakeholder" Payments Under
Federal Construction Contracts: Payment Bond Surety vs. Assignee, 47 VA. L. REv.
640 (1961).
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and timely performance and a payment bond for the protection of
laborers and materialmen.64 When a surety under a performance bond
is compelled to make payment or to "take-over" the contract and
complete the project, it is subrogated to the rights of the Government
as to the retained percentages under the contract;"s when a surety is
compelled to make payment under the payment bond to unpaid
laborers and materialmen, it is subrogated only to the "equitable priority"
of the unpaid laborers and materialmen in the retained percentages.66
The controversy arises when the surety and an assignee whose ad-
vances to the defaulted contractor have not been satisfied both assert a
claim to the retained percentages in the hands of the Government.
Insofar as the priorities under a performance bond are concerned,
there is general agreement that the right of the assignee is inferior to
that of the surety, since the surety is subrogated to the right of the
Government in the retained percentages, while the assignee's right can
rise no higher than the right of the defaulted assignorY.
However, there is a split of opinion between the Fifth Circuit and the
Court of Claims as to the priorities under a payment bond; the Fifth Cir-
cuit holds that the assignee has the better right,68 while the Court of
Claims maintains that the retained percentages should go to the surety. 9
The Fifth Circuit construes the Act as providing that all proceeds will be
paid over to the assignee so long as it has outstanding advances to the as-
signor, while the Court of Claims holds that the only effect of the Act
is to make the contract proceeds assignable for financing purposes, so
that the assignee's right to the proceeds is no greater than the assignor's
right.
The split between the Fifth Circuit and the Court of Claims applies
only to those cases in which the retained percentages are still in the
64. 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1964).
65. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896).
66. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947); Henningsen v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908). The "equitable priority" theory of
Munsey Trust seems to have been superseded in favor of recognition of a direct
claim to payment by Home Indem. Co. v. United States, 376 F.2d 890 (Ct. Cl. 1967),
but the case has not yet been expressly overruled.
67. Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Modern Indus.
Bank v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 808 (1948); Hardin County Say. Bank v. United
States, 65 F. Supp. 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
68. General Cas. Co. v. Second Nat'l Bank, 178 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'g
Coconut Grove Exch. Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 149 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1945).
69. Fidelity & Deposit Corp. v. United States, No. 345-65 (Ct. C1. April 19, 1968);
National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. CL. 1955); Royal Indem.
Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
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hands of the Government. There is accord on the principle that once
the proceeds are paid by the Government to the assignee, the surety
loses its priority by way of subrogation as the proceeds so paid are not
recoverable under the 1951 amendment to the Act 70 Similarly, the
priority of the surety under the performance and payment bonds applies
only to those payments earned after default by the assignor since the
surety has no right or subrogation until the default occurs.71
It seems clear that the final decision as to whether the assignee or
payment bond surety will prevail in any given case lies in the hands of
the disbursing officer designated in the contract, since a direct payment
to the assignee would be conclusive under the 1951 amendment, whereas
a decision to withhold payment will give rise to a Tucker Act suit,12
under which the surety would prevail in the Court of Claims 3
CONCLUSION
Although it is apparent from the preceding discussion that there are
certain risks involved when advances are made to a contractor under the'
provisions of the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, it should be recog-
nized that in the great majority of cases the risks to the assignee are
minimal. Receivables financing through the medium of an assignment
seem to be the most simple and efficacious method of financing defense
production, while at the same time providing the assignee with a great
deal of security under the 1951 amendment to the Act. In short, it is
felt that the financing of production through the medium of progress
payments coupled with an assignment of such payments to a financial
institution, or the simple expedient of assigning the contract proceeds
prior to entering into production, is the best means by which the ma-
jority of contracts may be financed.
70. American Fidelity Co. v. National City Bank, 266 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
Bank of Arizona v. National Sur. Corp., 237 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1956).
71. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 304 F.2d 465 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964).
73. It is intriguing to speculate as to the situation that might result when a federal
tax lien enters the picture, since in such a case where payment is made directly to
the assignee under a contract containing the "no set-off" clause, the assignee will
prevail over the Government and the surety; whereas if payment is made to the
surety, the surety will prevail over the assignee and the Government will prevail over
the surety, since tax liens have priority over the claim of a Miller Act surety. United
States v. Munsey Trust Co. 332 U.S. 234 (1947); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. United
States, 97 F. Supp. 829 (Cr. Cl. 1951).
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